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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, Utah issued an 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine on December 8, 2000. Appellant timely filed a 
petition for interlocutory appeal and the Supreme Court of Utah granted that petition on 
March 9, 2001. Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court correctly decided, as a matter of law, that no 
recovery is available for diminishment in value of the remaining property in a 
condemnation proceeding where such diminishment is the direct result of the Utah 
Department of Transportation's highway reconstruction project, and where the 
reconstruction project necessarily involves a partial taking of Harvey Real Estate's 
adjacent property? 
The question is one of law, and the standard of review is de novo. See, e.g.. Carpet 
Barnv. Dept. of Transp.. 786 P.2d 770. 772-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1990): Utah State Road 
Comm'nv. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1974). 
This issue is preserved for appeal in Harvey Real Estate's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine regarding the closure of the intersection and 
the related arguments. (R. 435-45 and R. 567). 
2. Whether the trial court's determination to preclude Harvey Real Estate's 
experts from testifying as to any loss of value to Defendant's remaining property resulting 
from Plaintiffs highway restructuring project was appropriate under Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-34-10 (1996)? 
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"The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law," Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 1999 UT 36, TJ17, 977 P.2d 1201. and on appeal, the Court accords no deference 
to the legal conclusions of the district court. See kL 
This issue is preserved for appeal in Harvey Real Estate's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine regarding the closure of the intersection and 
the related arguments. (R. 435-45 and R. 567). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. The Utah Constitution guarantees: "Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." Art. 1, § 22. (emphasis added) 
(attached hereto as Addendum "A'*). 
2. Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-10 (1996) provides, in relevant part, that in 
eminent domain proceedings: 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered 
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and 
assess: 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger 
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed bv the plaintiff. 
(emphasis added) (attached hereto as Addendum "B"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves damages resulting from a partial taking of property ("the 
Harvey Property") belonging to Defendant Harvey Real Estate. Because of its unique 
location at the intersection of Highway 89 and the Old Mountain Road in Farmington, the 
Harvey Property lies in the path of a frontage road which Plaintiff Utah Department of 
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Transportation (uUDOTv) proposes to build. The frontage road is necessary to UDOT's 
proposed restructuring of Highway 89. UDOT exercised its eminent domain power to 
acquire the property it needed from Harvey Real Estate, but UDOT now contests the 
claim that Harvey Real Estate is entitled to compensation for the significant diminishment 
in market value caused to the remaining property. A pretrial hearing was held on 
September 21, 1999. UDOT subsequently filed a Motion in Limine requesting the district 
court to limit the admissibility of evidence and exclude testimony pertaining to any 
damages to Harvey Real Estate's remaining property resulting from UDOT's 
reconstruction project. On May 4, 2000, the district court issued its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on UDOT's Motion in Limine. The true and correct copy of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached hereto as Addendum "C." On 
December 8, 2000 the district court issued an order granting UDOT's Motion in Limine 
precluding Harvey Real Estate's experts from testifying as to any loss of value resulting 
from UDOT's actions, further stating that the jury would be instructed that no recovery is 
appropriate for the effects of the highway reconstruction project on the value of the 
remaining property. A true and correct copy of the district court's Order Granting 
UDOT's Motion in Limine is attached hereto as Addendum "D." 
UDOT and Harvey Real Estate appealed on separate issues. In its Order of Stay 
and Certification for Interlocutor} Appeal, dated December 8, 2000, the district court 
certified for interlocutor}' appeal the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
excluding testimony as to damages resulting from UDOT's highway restructuring. 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. Highway 89 from Farmington. Utah to South Ogden, Utah has long been a major 
transportation route, and it has undergone improvements over the years as its use has 
expanded. (R. at 545.) 
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2. In the 195(Ts, portions of Highwa\ 89 were converted to a limited access highway, 
with limited direct access from abutting properties. (Id.) 
3. Harvey Real Estate is the owner in fee simple of the Harvey Property, which is 
approximately 160 acres of vacant land directly abutting the intersection of Highway 89 
and the Old Mountain Road and located at the southeast corner of that intersection. (R. 
at 546, 554) (R 554 attached hereto as Addendum UE"). The intersection of Highway 89 
and Old Mountain Road is not located on the Harvey Property, but directly abuts it. (R. 
at 554.) 
4. The Harvey Property has direct access to Highway 89 and to the Old Mountain 
Road. (R. at 546.) The Harvey Property's direct access to and from Highway 89 is 
limited to a single access opening at the south end of the property. (Id.) UDOT claims 
that the direct access is 24 feet wide; Harvey Real Estate claims that it is 33 feet wide. 
(14) 
5. The Harvey Property's frontage on Old Mountain Road is located immediately 
east of the intersection with Highway 89, and its frontage with Highway 89 begins 
immediately south of the intersection. (R. at 546, 554.) 
6. Because Old Mountain Road intersects with Highway 89 only on the east side of 
the highway, there are only two properties abutting the intersection. (R. at 554.) There 
are no other properties with a size and location similar to that owned by Harvey Real 
Estate. (Id) 
7. For public safety reasons, UDOT recently determined to redesign Highway 89 and 
certain other intersecting routes, including Old Mountain Road. (R. at 545.) 
8. A significant part of UDOT's reconstruction project involves closing the 
intersection of Old Mountain Road with Highway 89, and rerouting Old Mountain Road 
to connect with the improved Cherry Hills interchange approximately one-half mile to the 
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south. (R. at 545, 556.) To reroute Old Mountain Road, it will be necessary to build a 
frontage road running south to the Cherry Hills Interchange. (R. at 556.) To construct 
the frontage road, UDOT is taking approximately 1.31 acres of the Harvey Property. (R. 
at 38, 44, 46, 545, 553.) 
9. Significantly, it is because of the Harvey Property's prime location at the 
intersection that the property is necessary for the completion of UDOT's project. (R. at 
553. 554; see also R. at 470-72.) 
10. Access from the Harvey Property to Old Mountain Road will not be reduced in 
size by UDOT's reconstruction project, and frontage on Old Mountain Road for the 
Harvey Property will be increased. (R. at 546.) The Harvey Property will retain access to 
Old Mountain Road but will no longer have immediate access to Highway 89. (Id.) 
11. Once UDOT's reconstruction is complete, direct access between Highway 89 and 
the Harvey Property will be completely lost, (id.), as the frontage road will run the entire 
length of the Harvey Property, effectively severing it from Highway 89. (R. at 553). On 
the south, traffic will have to go one-half mile south to the Cherry Hill interchange. (R. 
at 546-47.) To the north of the Harvey Property there will be no frontage road, so 
northbound traffic will have to travel three-fourths of a mile to Nicholls Road through an 
existing subdivision to enter the highway, and southbound traffic will have to exit the 
highway at 400 North and travel approximately one and a half miles to reach the Harvey 
Property. (Id.) 
12. The reconstructed Highway 89 will also be twenty to twenty-five feet below grade 
and the Harvey property will suffer from diminished visibility in the after condition. (R. 
at 567, p. 33.) 
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13. If allowed, Harvey Real Estate's experts will testify that the intended use of the 
Harvey Property prior to UDOT's proposal to reconstruct Old Mountain Road was for 
commercial purposes, and that the highest and best use of the Harvey Property was 
commercial. (R. at 547.) 
14. Harvey Real Estate seeks severance damages for the substantial diminution in 
value to the Harvey Property caused by UDOT's partial taking of the Harvey Property and 
the construction proposed by UDOT. (R. at 443.) 
15. If allowed, Harvey Real Estate's experts will testify that UDOT's taking and 
reconstruction of the Old Mountain Road will substantially decrease the value of the 
remaining property, and that as a direct result of UDOT's actions, the Harvey Property is 
no longer feasible as commercial property. (R. at 436, 547.) Its highest and best use has 
changed from commercial to low-end residential. (Id.) 
16. The harm to the remaining property is in the nature of a decrease in the market 
value of the land itself, not in the nature of lost business profits. (R. at 442.) 
17. The Harvey property will suffer a peculiar injury that will not be suffered by other 
adjacent landowners. (R. at 567, p. 26). 
18. UDOT's experts, if called, will testify that the Harvey Property had limited 
commercial value before the condemnation due to the dangers and limitations of the 
intersection, and due to the limited size of the frontage, and that after the condemnation 
the Harvey Property is equally usable as commercial property compared to its usefulness 
before the taking. (R. at 547-48.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Harvey Real Estate is entitled to a reversal of the district court's Order granting 
UDOT's Motion in Limine precluding Harvey Real Estate from presenting evidence of 
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diminished property value due to UDOT's partial taking and road construction. The 
district court erred in concluding that Utah severance law does not take into account such 
factors as diminished access, inconvenience of travel, loss of traffic flow and diminished 
visibility. Severance damages include any harm that significantly diminishes the market 
value of the remaining property so long as there is a partial taking and the harm is a result 
of the actual taking or of the "construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by 
the plaintiff." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1996). Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
34-10 requires that "the court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be 
offered by any of the parties" relating to severance damages. Because the district court 
did not allow the jury to hear such evidence, it committed reversible error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-34-10 REQUIRES THAT EVIDENCE 
OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES RESULTING FROM UDOT'S 
RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
The district court erred by precluding Harvey Real Estate from presenting evidence 
at trial that UDOT's proposed highway reconstruction project, including the closing of 
the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection, will cause significant damage to the 
remaining Harvey Property. The ruling of the district court effectively denies Harvey 
Real Estate from receiving Just Compensation for the taking of its property. The Utah 
Constitution, however, guarantees that private property "shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation." Art. 1, § 22. Where a state's action results in 
a taking of only part of an individual's property, "the law strives to reimburse the 
condemnee for all consequential damages to his property, including damages to the 
remainder, or severance damages. Severance damages are part of the Constitutional 
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requirement that no property be taken except for a public purpose and with just and full 
compensation therefor paid." 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 16.01 [1] (3d ed. 2001) 
(emphasis added). In Utah, where the condemning authority effects a partial taking of 
property, the owner is entitled to severance damages for any resulting harm to the 
remaining property. See Utah State Road Common v. Miva, 526 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 
1974). 
The issue of severance damages is properly a question for the jury, as required by 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-10 (1996). That Section governs the admissibility of 
evidence weighing toward severance damages and provides as follows: 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered 
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and 
assess: 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger 
parcel the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10(2) (1996) (emphasis added). This Section provides that the 
jury must be allowed to hear evidence to ascertain and assess what damages will accrue 
from the severance of the property taken and what damages arise from the "construction 
of the improvement in the manner proposed by [UDOT]." Id. 
This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have had many occasions to discuss the 
boundaries of Section 78-34-10 and previously have held that factors such as diminution 
of access, circuity of travel diversion of traffic and diminished visibility are relevant and 
weigh toward severance damages if they affect the value of the remaining property. See 
Miva. 526 P.2d at 929. See also 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 16.03[2][b][i] (in a 
partial taking, such factors as "circuity of travel, diversion of traffic . . . and 
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inconvenience due to construction" are relevant to determining severance damages.) 
Utah case law establishes that even those elements of a public construction project 
constructed entirely off of but adjacent to, the property being taken are to be considered 
in determining severance damages if they result in damage to the remaining property. 
Miya, 526 P.2d at 929. 
In Miya, the defendant land owner owned approximately 44 acres of farm land, 
one boundary of which abutted an existing public highway. Id. at 927. UDOT1 acquired 
.66 acre of Miya's land for highway purposes. Id. In the existing highway right of way 
located in front of Miya's property, UDOT constructed a viaduct to cross a set of railroad 
tracks. IdL at 928. The viaduct was built entirely within the existing public right of way 
- no part of the viaduct encroached on Miya's property. Id As part of the construction 
project, a frontage road was built on Miya's property which provided access for that 
remaining property, although a minor amount of circuity of travel was added. Id. At 
trial, Miya's expert opined that the highest and best use of the land had been for 
residential purposes and that the construction of the viaduct would negatively affect the 
value of the remaining land, since would-be buyers would not want to buy a home facing 
a giant concrete structure, id at 927-28. 
UDOT made the same argument in Miya that it is advancing here, i.e., that the 
defendant is not entitled to severance damages because the harm to the remaining land 
was not the result of the actual taking. Rather, UDOT argued that the harm was the result 
of the construction which occurred off the subject property and on the existing right of 
way, and, consequently, the trial court had erred. IdL In other words, UDOT sought to 
treat the construction of a viaduct in the public road as separate and distinct from the 
1
 The Utah State Road Commission changed its name to the Utah Department of 
Transportation subsequent to Miva. 
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partial taking of Miya's property or the construction of a frontage road thereon. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that Miya was entitled to compensation for the diminution in market 
value caused by UDOT's construction project, including construction of the viaduct. Id. 
at 929. 
The Miya Court explained that owners of land abutting a public street have 
property rights in "access, light, and air," and that such property rights "may not be taken 
away or impaired without just compensation." Id. at 928-29 (emphasis added.) Where 
construction of a public work in a public highway "violates some right appurtenant to the 
abutting property or otherwise inflicts some special and peculiar injury," the owner is 
entitled to compensation. Id at 929. See also State v. Hooper, 469 P.2d 1019 (Utah 
1970) (showing that the circuity of travel resulting from partial taking is proper 
consideration for severance damages); State Road Comm'n v. Utah Sugar Co., 448 P.2d 
901, 905 (Utah 1968) ("in assessing severance damages to the remaining property, 
consideration may be given to anything resulting from the taking, or the construction of 
the improvement which would . . . tend to reduce the value of the remaining property."); 
State v. Rozelle. 120 P.2d 276, 278 (Utah 1941) ("We have held that an abutting property 
owner may recover for losses sustained such as a result from the shutting off or 
interfering with his access, light, or air"). 
The harm inflicted on the remaining property in the instant case is of the same kind 
inflicted in Miya; as a direct result of the highway construction, the landowner's property 
will lose market value due to a significant change in its highest and best use. Harvey 
Real Estate's Property is peculiarly injured by UDOT's construction because of (1) the 
Harvey Property's unique location directly abutting the intersection (R. at 546, 554), (2) 
the Harvey Property's peculiar suitability for commercial development in the "before" 
condition (there is no other property abutting the intersection that can be developed 
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commercially) (R. at 547), (3) the diminished visibility as a result of the reconstructed 
Highway 89 being built twenty to twenty-five feet below grade (R. at 567, p. 33), and (4) 
the partial taking of the Harvey Property and the construction of a frontage road thereon. 
(R. at 38, 44, 46, 545 and 553). The Harvey Property, located as it is at the intersection of 
Interstate 89 and the Old Mountain Road, is a uniquely valuable piece of real estate. It 
abuts and enjoys direct access to and from both roads. Furthermore, Harvey Real Estate's 
Property is large enough to be developed commercially, whereas the only other property 
that abuts the intersection is too small to be developed. (R. at 554). Before UDOT 
announced its plans to restructure the two roads, the Harvey Property was ideally situated 
for commercial use. (R. at 547). 
Once UDOT has built the frontage road on the land taken from Harvey Real 
Estate, the Harvey Property will be separated from Highway 89 by the frontage road. (R. 
at 546). To access the remaining Property, potential customers of any commercial 
development would have to exit Highway 89 either one-half mile to the south or one and 
a half miles to the north of the Harvey Property. (R. at 546-47 and 553). Harvey Real 
Estate's experts will testify that UDOT's project will render the Harvey Property no 
longer capable of being developed commercially in the "after" condition. (R. at 436, 
547). They will also testify that the highest and best use of the Harvey Property will be 
changed from commercial to residential, causing substantial diminution in the Harvey 
Property's fair market value. (R. at id.). A would-be buyer would not pay the same price 
for the Harvey property in the "after" condition as it would in the "before" condition.2 (R. 
at id). 
2
 Circuity of travel, diversion of traffic, obstruction of visibility and inconvenience 
due to construction are factors which [though not "property" and hence not compensable in and 
of themselves,] may [if there is an accompanying taking] take on a new perspective as elements 
that a willing buyer and a willing seller would be forced to consider in arriving at a market 
value." 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 16.03[2][[b][i]. 
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Just as Miya was entitled to compensation for harm resulting from the total 
construction project, including the effects of the viaduct Harvey Real Estate is entitled to 
compensation for the harm caused by UDOT's construction project and its effects in toto 
on the Harvey Property.3 In Miya, the landowner still had the same amount of access to a 
public street, but rather than access to the main highway, the access was on the frontage 
road and its invisibility was obstructed b\ the viaduct. In the present case, although the 
Harvey Property still has access to a public street, it has lost its immediate access to 
Highway 89 and visibility is diminished. The access is now very circuitous and along the 
frontage road. 
In Miya, the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of the expert witness 
as to the effects of the total construction project on the market value of the remaining 
land. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court agreed that "relevant 
factors of severance damage, in ascertaining the fair market value of the remaining parcel, 
include impairment of light and air, impairment of view, invasion of privacy, and 
deprivation of access.4 Id. at 929. 
The Miya Court made it very clear that where there has been a partial taking, "just 
compensation is due if the market value of the property has been diminished," and the 
court will not consider the effects of the physical taking in isolation from the effects of 
3
 Contrary to UDOT's position, the Miya court specifically mentioned "access" as a 
right appurtenant to property abutting a public street, and further stated that the diminution of 
such a right must be compensated. Miya at 928-29. 
4
 By "deprivation of access" the Court cannot have meant that only a total loss of 
access is compensable because the Miya landowner suffered only "a certain amount of circuity of 
travel," not a total loss of access. Id at 928. Also, the Court specifically listed access as one of 
the rights that "may not be taken away or impaired without just compensation." Id. at 928-29 
(emphasis added). Other Utah cases also support the rule that severance damages are to be 
calculated with a view to the effects of the construction project as a whole. See, e.g. Three D 
Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Utah App. 1988) (where state actions 
"substantially diminish property value by impairing appurtenant property rights or causing 
'peculiar injury/ owner must be compensated even where there has bee no physical taking). 
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the government action as a whole. IcL at 928. Where a partial taking has occurred, 
diminished access is only one of a number of factors that may affect the value of the 
remaining property, and thus is a proper consideration for severance damages. "[T]he 
general rule is any type of damage may be considered insofar as it impairs the 'fair market 
value' of the remaining property." 7A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12.03[2]. 
Depending on the facts of the case, such factors may include diminution of access, loss of 
traffic flow, inconvenience of travel, or anything else that might be expected to negatively 
impact the property value. The trier of fact is to "consider all elements which are the 
natural and proximate result of the taking and which could legitimately affect the price 
that a prospective purchaser would pay for the land." 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 
14A.01[2] (emphasis added). An owner whose remaining property is adversely affected 
by one of these various harms is entitled to recover, not for the harm per se, but for any 
diminution in property value that results from the harm. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-10 requires that in determining severance damages, 
the jury must ascertain those "damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance [from the portion taken] and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." (emphasis added). UDOT's 
argument—that evidence should be limited to those effects that follow strictly from the 
taking itself—renders the second element of the statutory language meaningless and is 
therefor inappropriate. See supra Part II. This Court, therefore, should reverse the ruling 
of the trial court and order that the trial court permit Harvey Real Estate to introduce 
evidence at trial that the value of its remaining property has been diminished as a result of 
the UDOT construction project, including the closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain 
Road intersection. 
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II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 78-34-10 
RENDERS CERTAIN TERMS MEANINGLESS. 
The district court's reading of Section 78-34-10 is improper in that it restricts 
severance damages to those harms flowing only from the actual taking itself, and ignores 
the harm caused from the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by 
UDOT, including the closing of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection. The 
trial court's narrow approach to severance damages is in direct conflict with the language 
of the statute and renders part of the statute meaningless. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered 
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and 
assess: 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger 
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff. 
(emphasis added). Section 78-34-10 clearly states that the jury is to consider and evaluate 
evidence of harm to the remaining property resulting (1) "by reason of its severance from 
the portion sought to be condemned" and (2) by reason of "the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 
(1996). The trial court's interpretation renders the second element meaningless. 
It is a well-established rule of statutory interpretation that wherever possible, a 
court should "construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their terms." 
Lvonv. Burton. 2000 UT 19,1J17, 5 P.3d 616, 622 (quoting Schurtzv. BMW of N. 
Am., Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991)). This Court has stated that "any 
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interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be 
avoided." Lund v. Brown 2000 UT 75. T23. 11 P.3d 277, 282. 
In ruling that Harvey could not submit its evidence on severance damages, See 
infra Part I, the trial court based its reasoning on its conclusion that the loss of direct 
access to Highway 89 did not result directly from the taking itself.5 But by excluding the 
evidence based on this reasoning, the trial court completely read out of Section 78-34-10 
the second element that the jury must hear such legal evidence of harm caused by the 
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by UDOT. That second element 
is completely separate and distinct from the first element which deals with harm caused 
by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned. Section 78-34-10(2) 
provides for two, distinct elements of damages: (1) damages which will accrue to the 
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to 
be condemned and (2) damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by 
Plaintiff. The second element does not relate to damages flowing directly from the 
taking, but those damages resulting from the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by UDOT. These are the precise type of damages claimed by Harvey 
Real Estate and which the district court excluded. 
It is, however, possible to interpret Section 78-34-10 so that full effect is given to 
both elements of subsection 2. This interpretation requires that the jury be allowed to see 
5
 The district court found that evidence of harm to the Harvey Property resulting 
from UDOT's highway reconstruction "is not admissible, even though a portion of the subject 
property is taken by the action, since the damages alleged are not claimed to be the result of the 
loss of the property taken by the condemnation." (R. at 510.) Such a conclusion is plain error. 
The effects of the actual taking are indivisible from those of UDOT's reconstruction of the 
subject intersection and frontage road. The closure of the intersection depends necessarily on the 
construction of the frontage road, which, in turn, depends on UDOT's taking of the Harvey 
Property. But for the actual taking, the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection could not 
be closed. 
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and evaluate evidence of harm to the remaining property, and that this harm can result 
either "by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned" or by reason 
of "the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-34-10(2). Not only is this interpretation an entirely plausible reading of 
the statute, it is difficult to imagine any other reading which would give meaning and full 
effect to all the elements of the language. Moreover, Harvey Real Estate's interpretation 
is consistent with prior decisions of this Court. See infra Part I. 
Since it is possible to give meaning to all the elements of the statute and since the 
trial court's interpretation rendered part of the statute meaningless, the trial court's 
reading was an error of law. This Court, therefore, should reverse the decision of the 
district court and permit Harvey Real Estate to submit its severance damages evidence to 
the jury, including the effects of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection closure 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Harvey Real Estate respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the district court's Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and to remand for 
further proceedings. The district court's conclusion that diminished access, 
inconvenience of travel, loss of traffic flow and diminished visibility are inapplicable in 
evaluating a claim for severance damages contravenes the established law of the state. It 
would effectively prevent Harvey Real Estate from presenting evidence of harm accruing 
from any part of UDOT's construction project, including the physical taking itself, since 
the various aspects of the project are inextricably linked. Harvey Real Estate will be 
denied its Constitutional guarantee of just compensation for loss or injury to its property 
if the district court's order stands. Furthermore, Section 78-34-10 requires that the jury 
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be given an opportunity to hear expert testimony that UDOT's taking and construction 
project will significantly impair the market value of Harvey Real Estate's remaining land. 
DATED this \ ^ day of August, 2001. 
.PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
ROBERT E. MANfSFtELD 
TODD D. WEILEI 
Attorneys for Defenahqt/Appellant 
Harvey Real Estate, Limited Partnership 
17 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) true and exact copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following party on the fe dav of August, 
2001. 
Steven F. Alder 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5,h Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 
18 
ADDENDA 
Addendum "A": Utah Constitution. Article 1. Section 22. 
Addendum "B": Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 
Addendum "C": Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiffs Motion in 
Limine, dated May 4, 2000 
Addendum k'D": Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion in Limine, dated December 8, 
2000. 
Addendum "E": R. 554-Highway Right-of-Way map of Highway 89/Old Mountain 
Road intersection 
19 
Addendum A 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
VOLUME 1A 
1991 REPLACEMENT 
Constitutions and Historical 
Documents 
THE MICHIE COMPANY 
Law Publishers 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS A r t . I, § 2 2 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Appointment of administrator of estate 
Withholding tax. 
In general. 
No man can have a vested interest in the 
work or labor of another, nor has he a right to 
insist that another work for him, since that 
would violate this section. McGrew v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur . 2d Involuntary 
Servitude and Peonage § 1 et seq. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
ANALYSIS 
Advance payment of compensation. 
Airplane overflights. 
Closing street. 
Consequential damages. 
—Railroad. 
—Road construction. 
—School construction. 
Defense to condemnation proceeding. 
Elements of taking or damage. 
Fair market value. 
Section self-executing. 
Highway easement. 
Intangible factors. 
Interest in condemnation proceedings. 
Inverse condemnation. 
Just compensation. 
Municipal employment prerequisites. 
Removal of personal property. 
Services of attorney in defending indigent. 
Statute of limitations. 
Taxes. 
Water rights. 
Cited. 
Advance payment of compensation. 
This section provides merely that the prop-
Appointment of administrator of estate. 
This section prohibits the appointment of a 
person to serve as administrator of a decedent's 
estate if that person refuses to consent to such 
appointment In re Estate of Cluff, 587 P 2d 
128 (Utah 1978) 
Withholding tax. 
e
 Provision requiring that a city withhold 
0
 state income taxes due from employees does 
t not subject the city to involuntary servitude. 
Salt Lake City v State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah 
•. 2d 359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961). 
C.J.S. — 70 C.J.S. Peonage § 3; 80 C.J.S. 
Slaves § 10 
Key Numbers. — Slaves ®=> 24. 
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation, and does not 
require compensation to be paid in advance. 
Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 
503 P.2d 144 (1972). 
Airplane overflights. 
For discussion of taking issues in an action 
by landowners alleging that their land has 
been "taken" by overflights, see Katsos v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 
1986). 
Closing street. 
Where city, without notice, petition, or hear-
ing, closes a portion of a street and alley abut-
ting on school board-owned property on both 
sides and used for vehicular travel, and thus 
creates a cul-de-sac as to privately owned prop-
erty, there has been a taking requiring just 
compensation. Boskovich v. Mid vale City 
Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952). 
Closing of city street and alleged impair-
ment of access to commercial properties was 
not a "damaging" or "taking" within the mean-
ing of this section; the alleged damages re-
sulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence 
and not a permanent, continuous, or inevitably 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Addendum B 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
VOLUME 9 
1996 REPLACEMENT 
Title 78 
MICHIE 
Law Publishers 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
the tendered amount of money without raising Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 (1947). 
any objections to the taking, or reserving any 
issues related to the taking, including the date Suit to enjoin construct ion by state . 
of valuation, the date of valuation and the date 
interest accrues could not be changed. DOT v. — Immunity. 
Ogden & Sons, 805 P.2d 173 (Utah 1990). Suit to enjoin state road commissioners, as 
0 ~ , . ,. -. individual members, and a contractor from pro-
Recovery or damages from condemnor. , . , , . . , 
T7_ , < I A - W I in 4 i i 4 4\ 4 i ceeding with any work on a viaduct to be 
rovmer ^ \()4--(->\-K) eonlempUiled that dam- , , • ,. r , • -m, 
ages might flow from occupancy of promises — r u c i e d in rent of plaintiffs property until 
and that if so, plaintiff should reimburse defen- P l a m t l f f h a d b e e n P a i d appropriate money 
dant. North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & damages was unsuccessful; commissioners 
Irrigation Co., 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577 were engaged m the performance of their duties 
(1950) m t n e exercise of the police power of the state to 
better provide for the orderly flow of traffic and 
— Fol lowing dismissal of proceedings . were thus given the same immunity from suit 
City which obtained immediate possession of as is given to the state or to its commissions, 
water rights but dismissed condemnation pro- Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 
ceeding before adjudication of value of property 503 P.2d 144 (1972). 
was liable for all damages caused by the taking 
and holding of possession; loss of rents and Cited in Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 
deprivation of use of property were among the 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Utah Dep't 
losses which could be recovered by the of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4 (Utah 
condemnee in independent action. Moyle v. Salt 1995). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Condemnor's main Proceedings, 1967 Utah L. Rev. 548. 
Liability for Damages Arising Through Insti- C.J.S. — 29AC.J.S. Eminent Domain § 221. 
tuting, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Do- Key Numbers . — Eminent Domain «= 187. 
78-34-10. Compensation and damages — How assessed. 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by 
any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and 
assess: 
(1) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improve-
ments thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate 
estate or interest therein; and if it consists of different parcels, the value 
of each parcel and of each estate or interest therein shall be separately 
assessed; 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a 
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to 
be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff; 
(3) if the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by 
the construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such 
damages; 
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and 
each estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the 
construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff. If the benefit 
shall be equal to the damages assessed under Subdivision (2) of this 
section, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except 
the value of the portion taken; but if the benefit shall be less than the 
damages so assessed, the former shall be deducted from the latter, and the 
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remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the value of 
the portion taken. 
(5) As far as practicable compensation must be assessed for each source 
of damages separately. 
;tory: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
>., 104-34-10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
rse possessors. 
il easement. 
en of proof. 
equential or severance damages. 
ritions. 
2nce. 
es of streets and sidewalks. 
determined. 
iction. 
mictions. 
iines. 
ic improvement. 
*oads. 
ts of landowner. 
ol property. 
s or elements of damages. 
ict. 
ir rights. 
3SS. 
:tion by abutting owner of property against 
oad to recover damages to property by 
on of construction and operation of railroad 
lblic street in front of his property by which 
ess and egress to and from property was 
sded, and use was otherwise directly af-
id, came within Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22; 
sure of damages was amount that property 
depreciated in market value. Morris v. 
?on Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 14, 102 P. 629 
'9). 
L action condemning land for use in widen-
and improving an arterial highway, where 
ie of right of access to highway appurtenant 
he property taken was included in the 
rd for the land, the property owners had no 
ii for additional damages for loss of access 
ie highway from their remaining property, 
relationship of the remaining property to 
highway was the same as if a new roadway 
been constructed adjacent to the property, 
h Rd. Comm'n v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 
P.2d 917 (1963). 
ights of access, light and air are easements 
urtenant to land abutting on a street, and 
I not be taken or impaired without just 
pensation; testimony as to severance dam-
3 (impairment of light, air and view, inva-
sion of privacy and deprivation of access) from 
construction of viaduct within right of way was 
properly admitted. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. 
Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974). 
Construction of viaduct upon public right of 
way, allegedly interfering with adjacent land-
owner's right of access by making it impossible 
to use entire width of street to maneuver large 
trucks into its warehouse, was not a "taking" of 
property for which state was liable. Bailey Serv. 
& Supply Corp. v. State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n, 533 
P.2d 882 (Utah 1975). 
Adverse possessors. 
Severance damage to nonowned land held by 
peaceable possession was improperly allowed 
defendants since they did not own the fee and 
their possession had not thereby been dis-
turbed. State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. LeSourd, 24 
Utah 2d 383, 472 P.2d 939 (1970). 
Aerial easement. 
Landowner over whose property city con-
demned an aerial easement was entitled not 
only to compensation for diminution in value of 
the property directly affected, but severance 
damages as well. Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen, 
558 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). 
Burden of proof. 
In proceeding to take private property for 
public use, burden is on owner of property to 
prove amount of his damages. Tanner v. Provo 
Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105,121 
P. 584 (1911), aff'd, 239 U.S. 323, 36 S. Ct. 101, 
60 L. Ed. 307 (1915). 
Consequential or severance damages. 
Church could not recover damages from rail-
road in independent action because ringing of 
bells, sounding of whistles, and noises emanat-
ing from railroad locomotives disturbed meet-
ings and exercises conducted in church build-
ing, where there was no physical interference 
with church property. Twenty-Second Corp. of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 238, 103 P. 
243, 140 Am. St. R. 819 (1909). 
Except for provisions contained in Utah 
Const., Art. I, Sec. 22, action would not lie for 
mere consequential injuries to real property by 
reason of construction and operation of rail-
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Addendum C 
Steven F. Alder (#0033) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham (#1231) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys For Plaintiff 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0216 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARVEY REAL ESTATE, 
Limited Partnership, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
Case No. 980700311 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
The Plaintiffs Motion in Limine having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court 
on the 19th of January, 2000, at 8:00 a.m. and the parties having submitted memoranda in support 
of their positions and the court having heard argument from counsel for the parties, and otherwise 
having being fully advised , does HEREBY MAKE THE FOLLOWING: 
00505 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Highway 89 from Farmington, Utah to South Ogden, Utah has been used since the 
early settlement of this area, as a major route for transportation, and as its use expanded, the road 
was improved and the alignment modified. 
2. In the 1950fs, portions of the road were converted to a limited access highway, with 
direct access to the improved four lane highway from abutting properties, including the property 
owned by the Defendant, being limited and generally restricted. 
3. UDOT has recently determined to redesign Highway 89 for public safety reasons and 
considerations. 
4. As part of this major redesign project, UDOT has decided to close the intersection 
of the Old Mountain Road with Highway 89 and to construct a frontage road to connect the Old 
Mountain Road with an improved Cherry Hills Interchange located approximately Vi mile to the 
south. 
5. This condemnation action involves the actual taking of approximately 1.31 acres of 
the Defendant's property needed to construct the new frontage road. Exhibit A attached to the 
Condemnation Resolution shows the layout of a portion of the Defendant's property that is being 
acquired and the location of this property in relation to the location of the existing Highway 89, the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine 
Case No. 980700311 2 
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existing Old Mountain Road, and the adjoining properties. 
6. The Defendant owns approximately 160 acres of vacant land that is currently 
accessible from the Old Mountain Road at the northwest corner of Defendant's property by means 
of property frontage that abuts the Old Mountain Road as shown on the property ownership plat 
Exhibit B. 
7. The Defendant's frontage on Old Mountain Road is located east of the intersection 
with Highway 89, and its frontage with Highway 89 begins south of the intersection as shown on 
Exhibits A and B. 
8. Direct access from and onto Highway 89 from Defendant's property is prohibited 
except for one permitted access gate at the south end of the property that is claimed by the Plaintiff 
to be 24 feet in width and claimed by the Defendant to be 33 feet in width. This permitted access 
gate on to Highway 89 is being eliminated by this condemnation action. 
9. The existing access from the Defendant's property onto the Old Mountain Road is 
not being reduced in size by this project, and access to the new Old Mountain Road/frontage road 
will increase accessible frontage for the Defendant's property from the existing 100 feet to over 
1,100 feet and will provide the Defendant with reasonable access via the public roads after the 
condemnation. 
10. As a result of the intersection closure, traffic will be required to travel along the new 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine 
Case No. 980700311 3 
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frontage road to Cherry Hills Interchange Vi mile south, or north along the existing Old Mountain 
Road to Nicholls Road 3/4 mile to access Highway 89; southbound traffic on Highway 89 will be 
required to exit at 400 North Street located approximately one and one half (1 Vi) miles north and 
travel on the Old Mountain Road. There is no frontage road north of the closed intersection. The 
proposed Cherry Hill Interchange and frontage road is shown on Exhibit C and the existing roads 
north of the project are shown on Exhibit D. 
11. The Defendant seeks severance damages for the diminution in value to its real 
property alleged to be caused by the closure of the Old Mountain Road /Highway 89 Intersection, 
and alleged to result in a change in the highest and best use of the property from the before to the 
after condition. 
12. The Defendant's experts if called would testify that the closing of the Old Mountain 
Road Highway 89 Intersection will substantially decrease the value of the Defendant's property, and 
that as a direct result of the closing of the intersection the subject property is no longer usable as 
commercial property in the after condition, thus changing its highest and best use and causing 
substantial severance damages. 
13. The Plaintiffs experts would testify that the subject property had limited commercial 
value before the condemnation due to the dangers and limitations of the intersection and due to the 
limited size of the frontage, and that after the condemnation the property is equally usable as 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine 
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commercial as before the condemnation. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The closure of the intersection is within the police powers of UDOT and the closure 
of the intersection does not require the taking of any portion of the Defendant's property. 
2. The Defendant has no express or implied easement, or other appurtenant property 
right to access Highway 89 by means of the intersection with Old Mountain Road, but rather this is 
a right that is shared equally by the Defendant with all of the other properties on Old Mountain Road 
and with the public at large. 
3. UDOT has jurisdiction to determine the safety of the intersection of Highway 89 and 
Old Mountain Road, and has concluded that the current and future use of this intersection creates 
unreasonable risks to the public safety. 
4. There can be no recovery for damages associated with the closure of an intersection 
adjoining a public street that is used to access a property where access to the public street is not taken 
and reasonable access by means of the public streets remains or is otherwise provided. 
5. Inconvenience of travel occasioned by being required to follow a more circuitous 
route due to a completed highway project is not a proper subject for a damage award. 
6. Loss of traffic flow is non-compensable, and evidence of possible devaluation in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine 
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property value due to loss of traffic flow past a property is not allowed. 
7. Where a condemnation and taking of real property occurs, there must be a causal 
connection between the taking of the property as part of a condemnation action, and the damages 
claimed; and where the damages are the result of the intersection closure, and not the result of the 
loss of property taken, they are not compensable. 
8. Evidence of alleged damages from the intersection closure is not admissible, even 
though a portion of the subject property is taken by the action, since the damages alleged are not 
claimed to be the result of the loss of the property taken by the condemnation. 
9. The Defendant is not entitled to compensation for the loss of access due to the closure 
of the intersection where neighboring properties that are similarly impacted by the intersection 
closure would not be entitled to seek compensation. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine 
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10. Appraisal testimony concerning the effect of the road closure on the value of 
subject property is not to be admitted. 
DATED this _[_ day of Awkf2000. 
BY THE COURT 
ROBERT E.\MANSFIE\,D 
Attorney for tlkDefendant 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine 
Case No. 980700311 
MICHAEL G. ALLPH 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT 
and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE was mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, this ol & day of April, 2000, to: 
Robert E. Mansfield 
Parry Anderson & Mansfield 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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Addendum D 

Steven F. Alder (#0033) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham (#1231) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys For Plaintiff 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O.Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0216 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARVEY REAL ESTATE, 
Limited Partnership, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
Judge 
ORDER 
ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
980700311 
Michael G. Allphin 
The Plaintiffs Motion in Limine having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court 
on the 19th day of January, 2000 at 8:00 a.m., and the parties having submitted memoranda in support 
of their positions, and the Court having heard argument from counsel for the parties, and otherwise 
having being fully advised, the Court DOES HEREBY 
ORDER ADJUDGE AND DECREE that the Defendant's experts are precluded from 
DEC 1 1 2000 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
00525 
testifying as to any loss of value due to the road closing, and the jury shall be instructed that no 
recovery is appropriate for the effect of the closure of the intersection of the Old Mountain Road 
with Highway 89 on the value of the Defendant's property. 
DATED this _ ^ L day of M^~ 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
MICHAEL G.ALLPHIN, 
District Court Judge 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine 
Civil No. 980700311 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, this / day of 
jUfce^iiJ*-* - 2000, to: 
Robert E. Mansfield 
Parry Anderson & Mansfield 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine 
Civil No. 980700311 
jja-yi^r^ ^A+strn 
00527 
Addendum E 
fe 
<* 
• 
* 
* 
a 
* 
* 
^ 
* 
**l j 
i *i 
i • 
^ 
* H 
1*1 
N 
1 *  % 
L ? il 
